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Reimbursing Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs
Under CERCLA: A Move Toward Re-establishing
a Faithful Application of State
Insurance Law
I. AN INTRODUCTION To HAZARDOUS WASTE
CLEANUP COSTS AND INSURANCE POLICY
CONSTRUCTION
In 1983, the federal government took a drastic step in the handling of
hazardous waste accidents: it bought up all the homes in a town con-
taminated by the toxic chemical dioxin.' The government appropriated
thirty-six million dollars to facilitate the evacuation of the residents of
Times Beach, Missouri, after the town was polluted by dioxin mishan-
dling.2 The eventual cleanup cost to the federal government topped
ninety-six million dollars When the federal government and the state
of Missouri sought reimbursement from the parties responsible for the
pollution, the polluters turned to their comprehensive general liability
(CGL) insurance policies for indemnification.4 However, their insurance
companies claimed that the CGL policies did not cover cleanup costs.6
1. See Robert Reinhold, U.S. Offers to Buy All Homes in Town Tainted by Di-
oxin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1983, at Al.
2. Contaminated Town is Relegated to History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1985, at 26
(discussing Times Beach, Missouri's ruin by toxic waste and subsequently disincorpo-
ration by the last Board of Aldermen). In 1971, Independent Petrochemical Corpora-
tion (IPC) assisted one of its customers, Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Company (NEPACCO), in removing over 20,000 gallons of waste containing dioxin.
See Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp.
1334, 1339 (D.D.C. 1986). IPC hired an independent contractor who removed the
waste, blended it with waste oils and subsequently used the mixture as a dust sup-
pressant in various areas throughout Missouri. Id. The spraying of this toxic dust
suppressant led to personal injury claims and property damage. Id, at 1339-40.
3. Jonathan Moses & Wade Lambert, Insurers Lose Round in Environmental
Cleanup, WAu ST. J., Sept. 16, 1991, at B2 (presenting a current estimate of the
costs).
4. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 654' F. Supp. at 133940. The federal gov-
ernment sued pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
5. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 654 F, Supp. at 1341.
Thus, the groundwork was laid for protracted and complex litigation
between the insured and the insurer that eventually led to a split be-
tween two federal circuits.6
The issues in the litigation that arose from the Times Beach disaster
have been aggressively contested in the Eighth Circuit in Continental
Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.7
(NEPACCO) and in the District of Columbia Circuit in Independent
Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.' (IPC). These two
circuits considered both Missouri insurance contract law and the appli-
cable provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), under which the government
proceeded in its suit for reimbursement.'
The Eighth Circuit held that the insured party was liable for reim-
bursement of the cleanup costs."0 The court based this holding on two
main grounds. First, the court reasoned that CERCLA itself creates legal
and equitable causes of action and that the government's action for
reimbursement lay in equity." Second, since the government proceeded
in equity, there could be no coverage under a CGL policy because those
policies cover only damages that are legal remedies.2
In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to find that the
CERCLA provisions provided a meaningful distinction between legal
and equitable relief."3 Therefore, the court concluded that the CGL pol-
icy covered reimbursement of the cleanup costs." Thus, the two cir-
cuits disagree on the central issue of whether cleanup cost reimburse-
ment constitutes damages compensable under a CGL insurance con-
tract.
Interpretation of CGL policies has been a matter of state construc-
tion. Several states have addressed this issue, generally siding with
6. These circuits are the District of Columbia Circuit and the Eighth Circuit. See
Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (finding that according to Missouri law, CGL insurance policies cover
cleanup costs); Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842
F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that under Missouri law cleanup
costs are equitable, not legal "damages" and thus are not covered by CGL policies).
7. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
8. 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
9. Id. at 943-47; Continental, 842 F.2d at 983-87.
10. Continental, 842 F.2d at 987.
11. Id. at 986-87.
12. Id. at 983-84.
13. See Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 947. Accord AIU Ins. Co. v.
FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1273-75 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (noting that the legislative
history of CERCLA does not provide adequate insight as to the differences between
the so-called damages clause and the cleanup clause).
14. AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1273-75.
15. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 431-32 (D.
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the insured in favor of coverage for hazardous waste cleanup costs.'6
However, as IPC and NEPACCO illustrate, the question is far from
settled on the federal level.' NEPACCO stands for the proposition that
under CGL policies, the term "damages" does not include cleanup
costs."6 In contrast, IPC validates the expectancy of the insured and
attaches an expansive meaning to the term "damages."" Some state
courts have continued to rely on the NEPACCO holding;' therefore, it
is critical to analyze the reasoning behind that decision and what im-
pact the IPC ruling will have upon NEPACCO's apparent persuasive
effect. Further, the split in the circuits gains importance since it is un-
likely that the United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue.'
This fact, coupled with the reality that these costs represent a potential
Md. 1986) affd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988)
(applying Maryland law regarding insurance contract construction).
16. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990) (en banc); Spangler Constr.
Co. v. Industrial Craneshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071, (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied,
545 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1989).
17. Several federal courts have found that CGL policies, when interpreted with
respect to the governing state law, cover response or cleanup costs that are sought
by governmental entities. These costs constitute the type of damages intended to be
covered as indicated by the policy's language. See Independent Petrochemical Corp.,
944 F.2d at 945-47 (construing CGL policies according to Missouri law); New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987) (constru-
ing CGL policies according to Delaware law).
For the opposite conclusion, finding no insurer liability or duty to defend, see
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 984-
87 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (construing Missouri law); Mraz v. Canadian Universal
Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327-30 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing Maryland law).
18. Continental, 842 F.2d at 985.
19. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 945.
20. See, -e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187-89 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), rev'd, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990) (reasoning that the NEPACCO holding indi-
cates that the plain meaning of damages within the insurance context is unambiguous
and does not include equitable relief); Grisham v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 927
F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1991) (construing Arkansas law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec.
of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 744-45 (W.D. Wash. 1988); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L.
Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp 950, 954 (N.D. MII. 1988).
21. "The Supreme Court is not going to touch this with a 10-foot pole," noted an
attorney whose firm represents many policy holders. Barnaby J. Feder, Business and
the Law; 7Te Insurer's Role In Waste Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at D2. The
reason is that the CGLs are interpreted according to state law, and furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has refused to hear similar matters relating to asbestos
damage. Id.
liability of five hundred billion dollars, underscores the significance of
determining whether federal courts will adhere to NEPACCO or choose
to follow the holding in IPC.'
This Comment focuses on two central issues: First, whether "damag-
es" within typical CGL policies include equitable as well as legal relief;
and second, whether ,the language of CERCLA creates a distinction
between these two types of relief that could prove dispositive to the
"damages" question.
Specifically, Section II of this Comment briefly describes CERCLA
and its main purposes. Attention is given to the language contained in
section 9607(a)(4)(A) and section 9607(a)(4)(C).' Insurers have relied
on this language to support their contention that a distinction exists be-
tween injunctive relief and damages.U Section III introduces the con-
cept and purpose of CGL policies and analyzes the various treatments
states give to the terms.
Section IV discusses the unique holding in NEPACCO and focuses on
the reasoning used by the court to find that the insurer was not liable
for reimbursement costs. The decision had a persuasive effect that
permeated numerous, important hazardous waste cases during the late
1980s and early 1990s. Section V describes the recent IPC decision and
analyzes whether that holding will have a settling effect on the uncer-
tainty and confusion that the NEPACCO decision caused in this high
stakes area of the law. Section V also analyzes the potential impact and
significance of IPC since that decision was rendered by a "foreign"
circuit. Section VI concludes that despite the creative arguments offered
by the insurance companies in NEPACCO, the holding in IPC is more
persuasive because it comports more closely with the spirit, purpose
and expectations inherent in CGL policies.
II. CONGRESSIONAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE
HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM-CERCLA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was enacted
to regulate matters associated with the transportation and disposal of
hazardous wastes.' However, it was not designed to adequately ad-
22. Id. Dennis J. Block and Johnathan M. Hatt, The SEC's 'Caterpillar' Order:
Trends in MD & A Disclosure, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1992, at 5 (presenting a current
estimate for Superfund cleanup costs).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
24. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184-85 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), rev'd, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990).
26. Id.
[Vol. 20: 217, 19921 CERCLA and Hazardous Waste Cleanups
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dress the problem of pre-existing hazardous waste.27 Consequently,
Congress commenced hearings to fashion legislation that would provide
a framework to determine the obligations of the parties responsible for
creating waste problems.' Congressional motivation was due in part to
the heightened public awareness of the devastating effects of hazardous
waste as graphically illustrated by the Love Canal chemical landfill
tragedy."' The Love Canal disaster resultedin an abnormally high inci-
dence of birth defects and cancer among the local residents. ° This di-
saster, coupled with other examples of spills and improper disposal
practices, firmly placed the issue on the national agenda.
Congress responded to these concerns by passing CERCLA in 1980.
While the RCRA dealt with the handling and disposal of hazardous
waste, CERCLA was formulated to provide for the cleanup of existing
hazardous waste sites.' In order to accomplish this goal, Congress em-
powered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to utilize
CERCLA to determine the parties responsible for the pollution.' Once
these parties were identified, CERCLA placed joint and several strict
liability on them retroactively.' Liability ranged from repaying the
United States Government for costs associated with cleaning up the
site' to damages for the injury and destruction of natural resources.'
In addition to placing liability on the responsible parties, CERCLA
was also charged with providing funds for the cleanup effort.2 Con-
gress created this pool of money by establishing the Hazardous Sub-
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1988).
28. See Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Re-
sponse Costs: The Limits of "Damages" in Comprehensive General Liability Policies,
16 EcoLOGy LQ. 755 (1989) (citing SAMUEL S. EPSTEIN ET AL, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN
AMERICA 7 (1982) (regarding the historical factor leading to the passage of CERCLA).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also Jonathan Friendly, President Asks 5-Year Extension of Toxic
Waste Cleanup Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1985, § 1, at 6. CERCLA was enacted
in "response to intense public concern about the health hazards from toxic chemicals
buried at thousands of sites." Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
33. Id.; see also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 737 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
34. See AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1275 (Cal. 1990) (en banc).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A); see, e.g., AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1260 (CERCLA
authorizes recovery of cleanup costs).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(c).
37. Id. at § 9611.
stance Superfund (Superfund).u While Superfund provided a starting
point for facilitating the cleanup of polluted sites, it was not intended
to be the sole source of funds.' Clearly, the Superfund coffers would
have to be replenished through actions filed against the responsible
parties under the authority of CERCLA.' The choice of which CERCLA
subsection to proceed under has become a significant issue in the haz-
ardous waste litigation battle."
A. Clauses of Controversy-CERCLA Sections 9607(a)(4)(A)
and 9607(a)(4)(C)
Section 9607(a)(4)(A) of Title 42 states that liability exists for "all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State."'.In essence, this subsection permits the EPA to
sue the responsible parties for reimbursement of governmental cleanup
or response costs.'
Section 9607(a)(4)(C) provides that the responsible party shall be
liable for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release."" On its face, this sub-
section appears to be limited to damages caused by the responsible
party through the improper or inadequate handling of hazardous waste.
Many courts and commentators' recognize that Congress provided
38. Id.
39. The Superfund was originally funded at $1.6 billion. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988).
40. See id. at § 9611.
41. See id, at § 9607(a)(4)(A) (providing a cause of action for governmental recov-
ery of cleanup or response costs), § 9607(a)(4)(C) (creating an action for damages
resulting from the release of toxins).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
43. See id,
44. Id at § 9607(a)(4)(C).
45. Compare Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
842 F.2d 977, 986-88 (8th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing the fact that Congress allowed for
separate causes of action and that creates a choice for the government to sue for
damages or cleanup costs which necessarily vary in their respective measurements of
liability) with Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944
F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court in /PC reasoned that other courts, including
a Supreme Court holding, indicate that the forms of relief granted under CERCLA
merge and do not distinguish between cleanup costs and damages. Id. at 947.
46. Compare Lonnie A. Jones, Comment, Insurance Coverage For Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: The Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy Defined, 39 CATH.
U.L REV. 195 (1989) (concluding that cleanup costs, an economic loss, are not equiv-
alent to property damage and therefore are not covered under a standard CGL in-
surance policy) with Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance Coverage of
CERCLA Response Costs: The Limits of "Damages" in Comprehensive General Liabil-
(Vol. 20: 217,.1992] CERCLA and Hazardous Waste Cleanups
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two separate causes of action under these subsections. Depending on
their interests, parties have either used the distinction to highlight statu-
tory intent for a clear separation between damages and response costs,
or argued that these clauses are, in effect, interchangeable.""
B. Construing the Clauses
There has been considerable debate and disagreement regarding the
relationship between Parts (A) and (C) of Section 9607(a)(4). While
some courts have exploited the distinction,' others have sought to
minimize the language." The debate is important because CGL policies
have been construed to provide coverage for "legal damages" only.'
Thus, the question becomes whether an action brought against a re-
sponsible party under Section 9607(a)(4)(A) for reimbursement of
cleanup costs constitutes damages.
1. Construing the Language Liberally
The camp that imposes liability on the insurers under a CERCLA Sec-
tion 9607(a)(4)(A) cause of action discount congressional intent regard-
ing the language and the existence of a separate "damages" subsec-
tion."1  Proponents point to Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' in
which the United States Supreme Court stated that CERCLA "clearly
ity Policies, 16 EcoLOGY L.Q. 755 (1989) (asserting that the term "damages" is ambig-
uous and that fact, coupled with insurance contract law, indicates that if a term is
ambiguous then it will be construed most favorably to the meaning that the pur-
chaser of the policy ascribed to it).
47. See supra note 41,
48. See Continental, 842 F.2d at 986-88; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643
F. Supp. 430, 432-35 (D. Md. 1986); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d
1325, 1328-29 (4th Cir. 1986).
49. See Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 947; AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC
Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1273-75 (Cal. 1990) (en banc); New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (D. Del. 1987); United States
Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 842-43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
50. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash. Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 744 (W.D. Wash.
1988); Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 106 A.2d 196, 198 (N.H. 1954). But see
Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dept. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 775
F. Supp. 718, 728 (D. Vt. 1991); AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1266 (Cal.
1990) (en banc).
51. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
62. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
permits suits for money damages against states in federal court." ' The
Court broadly reasoned that Section 9607 provides "liability in damages"
and did not distinguish cleanup costs from damages.' Thus, while this
case dealt with reimbursement to Pennsylvania for cleanup costs ex-
pended to remedy a hazardous waste release, it is significant that the
Court was not compelled to comment or differentiate between the two
clauses.'
The California Supreme Court also addressed the matter of the
CERCLA statutory language in AU Insurance Co. v. FMC Corp.'
Whereas the United States Supreme Court chose to omit any discussion
regarding the particular construction of Section 9607(a) in Pennsylva-
nia,7 the California Supreme Court elected to directly focus on the
purported distinction between Sections 9607(a)(4)(A) and (a)(4)(C).'
In AU Insurance Co., the California Supreme Court held that the
insured would be covered by his CGL policy and that the policy's cov-
erage of "damages" included reimbursement of cleanup costs sought
under CERCLA Section 9607(a)(4)(A)' The court discounted the signifi-
cance of the separate CERCLA clauses' and reversed the court of ap-
peal, which had in part relied on the distinction." The court observed
that the difference between the two clauses and the differing types of
recovery are not "clearly laid out in the statute itself nor fully explained
in its sparse legislative history."' Therefore, the court reasoned that
without a clear statutory directive the matter would be left to judicial
53. lId at 13.
54. Id, at 12. See also Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 837,
843 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (recognizing "that CERCLA is a broad, wide-ranging regulatory
and remedial regime"); Cannons Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 899 F.2d 79, 87 (Ist
Cir. 1990) (Congress did not intend to handcuff government negotiators in CERCLA
cases by insisting that the EPA allow polluters to pick and choose which settlements
they might prefer to join).
55. Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. at 23.
56. 799 P.2d 1253, 1273-75 (Cal. 1990) (en banc).
57. Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. at 23.
58. AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1261-63.
59. Id. at 1259.
60. Id. at 1261-63 (observing that various state court decisions have held that the
injunctive costs fit within a broad definition of "damages" envisioned by CERCLA).
See also United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich.
App. 1983) (question of coverage which hinges on the "mere fortuity" of which recov-
ery mechanism the Government will select in enforcing CERCLA is unreasonable).
61. AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1989), rev'd, 799 P.2d 1253
(Cal. 1990) (en banc).
62. AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1270. The court acknowledged that statutory distinc-
tions exist between 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (providing for response costs) and §
9607(a)(4)(C) (the "damages" remedy), but the court concluded that "Congress clearly
intended considerable overlap between the two forms of recovery." Id.
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interpretation.' Accordingly, the court adopted the view that the lack
of a clear directive would "unreasonably make coverage hinge on the
'mere fortuity' of which recovery mechanism... the government se-
lects in enforcing CERCLA.'
The court's viewpoint received further support in United States v.
Cannons Engineering Corp.,' in which the First Circuit evaluated the
language and intent of CERCLA. The court noted that an overriding
goal was to expedite "remedial measures for hazardous waste sites."'
The emphasis on quick response, to avoid the threat of uncontrolled
hazardous waste, indicates congressional intent to provide broad reme-
dies, rather than to force choices between different types of relief.7
An additional argument made by commentators6s and courts is
that because CERCLA was never intended to be an insurance statute, it
should not be construed to override or preempt state law controlling
insurance matters.'0 Moreover, some courts maintain that since
CERCI.A was not in existence when most CGL policies were entered
into,7 the technical differences between the clauses would not be dis-
63. CERCLA does not define the term "damages" and thus it is subject to judicial
interpretation which can necessarily lead to ambiguity. For an example of a clear
statutory directive see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(noting that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 carefully defines the term "sale" for
purposes of the Act and that this statutory definition serves to prevent alternative
definitions and constructions of the term for purposes regarding the Act).
64. AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1263.
65. 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
66. Id. at 89.
67. Id. See also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (adhering to a liberal
and expansive reading of CERCLA).
68. Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Response
Costs: The Limits of "Damages" In Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 16
EcoLOGy LQ. 755, 779 (1989) (noting that CERCLA does not define the relationship
between the insurer and the insured; therefore it "should not be used to define the
term 'damages' for the purpose of interpreting the scope of coverage of an insurance
policy").
69. Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 837, 843-44 (M.D. Fla.
1990). The court observed that 42 U.S.C. § 9672(a) itself clearly indicates that
CERCLA should not be "construed to affect either the tort law or the law governing
the interpretation of insurance contracts of any state." Id.
70. See supra notes 62-63.
71. CERCLA was enacted in 1980 and CGL insurance policies were widely sold to
hazardous waste producers and handlers in the 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., Continental
Ins. Co. v Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. Inc., 842 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir.
1988) (where NEPACCO was covered by three CGL policies from 1970 to 1972); Inde-
positive as to whether the insurer or the insured would be liable under
the statute.' Rather, the scope of liability would be determined based
on the intent of the parties at the time the CGL was formed."
2. Construing the Language Literally
Insurance companies7 4 and commentators'5 contend that the lan-
guage Congress employed indicates congressional intent to create a
distinction between law and equity.' They maintain that the selection
of which CERCLA provision to proceed under is crucial to the issue of
CGL policy coverage." In support of this distinction,' proponents" re-
ly on the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Bowen v. Mas-
sachusetts.' Though outside the hazardous waste and insurance con-
text, Bowen dealt specifically with whether a federal district court had
jurisdiction to review a decision made by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services disallowing state reimbursement under Medicaid for
certain services.8' The Secretary stressed that jurisdiction was improp-
er because the suit was not an action "seeking relief other than money
damages."' In rejecting this argument, the Court acknowledged that
even the "monetary aspects of the relief sought by the State are not
'money damages' as that term is used in Section 702."' The Court re-
pendent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 942-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (IPC was covered by 67 CGLs from 1971 to 1983).
72. AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1271 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (reason-
ing that the intent of the parties at the time that they mutually agreed to enter into
the insurance contract was the dispositive issue and that the later adopted technical
"niceties of statutory language" could not enter into the respective party's intent).
73. Id.
74. See C.C. Grisharm v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir.
1991); Continental, 842 F.2d at 986-88; Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., Ltd., 804
F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp.
950, 954 (N.D. Im. 1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 643 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D.
Md. 1986).
75. See Lonme A. Jones, Comment, Insurance Coverage For Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: The Comprehensive Liability Insurance Policy Defined, 39 CATH. U.L. REV.
195, 209-10 (1989) (contending that the language in CERCLA is indicative of a separa-
tion between an equitable remedy and a legal remedy).
76. See supra notes 74-75.
77. Id.
78. See Jones, supra note 75.
79. See Jones, supra note 75.
80. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
81. Id. at 882.
82. Id. at 891.
83. Id. at 893. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits a court
from dismissing an action seeldng relief "other than money damages." The Section
goes on to specify when that prohibition may take place. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
[Vol. 20: 217, 1992] CERCLA and Hazardous Waste Cleanups
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
lied on the plain meaning of the language and maintained that the ac-
tion lay in equity and was not an action for money damages." Insurers
have similarly relied on the law-equity distinction that was found by the
Court in Bowen and argue that this distinction should be applied to
CERCLA's "equitable" and "legal" clauses. '
The New Jersey Appellate Division spoke to this distinction within
the context of hazardous waste and insurance in CPS Chemical Co. v.
Continental Insurance Co." The court acknowledged the distinction
but held that the insurer must indemnify CPS under a CGL pollcy.'
The court creatively distinguished the act of paying the state, which
was viewed as "damages," from the state itself performing the remedial
action.' The court likened damages to medical bills "designed to re-
store an accident victim to health."' While the court recognized that a
legal action or an equity action was envisioned, the court finessed the
issue in a carefully constructed opinion.
A more faithful allegiance to this distinction was evident in Mraz v.
Canadian Universal Insurance Co.' While the Fourth Circuit did not
use the terms "legal" and "equity," in Mraz, the opinion focused on the
differences between the "response" provision in section 9607(a)(4)(A)
and the "damages" clause in section 9607(a)(4)(C)." In Mraz, the gov-
ernment cleaned up the polluted site and proceeded under section
9607(a)(4)(A). The court held that the insurer did not have to indemnify
Mraz under a CGL insurance policy because the complaint prayed for
84. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 897-98 (noting that Congress when enacting the statutory
language used the term "money damages" and that there was no indication that those
words would be the "functional equivalent of a broader concept such as 'monetary
relief.'").
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting insurer who propounded that
distinction).
86. 536 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1988).
87. Id. at 315. The suit was not brought under CERCLA, but was grounded in
state law, specifically the Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. Section
58:10-23.11 et seq. (West 1992) and the Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.
58:10A-1 et seq. (West 1992). CPS Chemical Co., 536 A.2d at 312.
88. Id at 316.
89. Id. The court reasoned that CPS merely had an obligation to pay money and
not to take any remedial action. Thus, CPS was never enjoined to perform a task (oth-
er than payment). Id. Therefore, the action was based on legal grounds and not in
equity.
90. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing Maryland law and rendered two
months after Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986)).
91. Id. at 1328-29.
recovery of the costs incurred by the government.' The court's inquiry
characterized the response costs as an economic loss and not property
damage that was outside the scope of the CGL policy.'
As the cases indicate, the weight assigned or attributed to CERCLA's
statutory language varies according to the position of the party.' The
insurers assert that the law-equity distinction is clearly delineated and
the distinction must be regarded as a significant factor in determining
the ultimate question of liability under a CGL contract." In contrast,
the insured parties downplay the language.' They maintain that the
ultimate question of liability under a CGL policy should be answered by
analyzing the terms of the policy and the intent of the parties.97
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
The CGL form of insurance coverage has been in existence for over a
century and is widely used.' The clauses and terms are generally stan-
dardized" and the insurer typically places limitations upon the covered
risk by inserting exclusion provisions.'" CGL's are the preferred form
92. Id. at 1329.
93. Id.
94. See AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1270-71 (Cal. 1990) (noting that
state law, not CERCLA, is dispositive on the issue of insurance policy interpretation).
But see Maryland Casualty Co., 643 F. Supp. at 434 (finding CERCLA's distinction
between §§ 9607(a)(4)(A) and (a)(4)(C) to provide the party a choice to proceed in
either a legal fashion or in an equity manner).
95. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (maintaining that CERCLA's
statutory language plainly displays Congressional intent to create a distinction be-
tween a damages action and an injunctive measure).
96. See AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1270-71; New Castle County v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that "damages" may
refer to economic damages or cleanup costs).
97. See AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1264; Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W.
2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
98. Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Response
Costs: The Limits of "Damages" In Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 758 (1989).
99. See infra text accompanying note 103.
100. These exclusion provisions are utilized by insurers in order to narrow their
scope of risk based on business considerations and premiums charged. Within the
context of hazardous waste coverage various exclusions have been inserted into the
CGL policies. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 750 F. Supp.
1340, 1348 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (pollution exclusion clause precluding the insured from
coverage if the pollutants release is not sudden and accidental); Gerrish Corp. v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 754 F. Supp. 358, 361-62 (D. Vt. 1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 2939 (1992) (CGL contained exclusionary language that precluded coverage
of specific type of pollutant unless the release was sudden or accidental); Broadwell
Realty Sews., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 77 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987)
(coverage did not include damages to the insured's own property).
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of coverage for hazardous waste producers and handlers.'"' The reso-
lution of the issue of coverage under an insurance contract centers
upon the language utilized in the insurance policy. This Section analyz-
es the specific CGL policy language that has spawned much of the con-
troversy regarding hazardous waste litigation.
A. The "Damages" Clause
During the period of time that dioxin was improperly disposed of in
Times Beach, both IPC and NEPACCO were covered by CGL poli-
cies. 2 A representative sample of a CGL policy coverage provision
specifically addressing damages states: "[T]he company will pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obliged to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence .... 
The present debate centers on the phrase "legally obliged to pay as
damage.,. The responsibility of construing the language is vested
within each state."e Most judicial interpretation starts with the prem-
ise that the plain meaning of the policy is dispositive.'" The rationale
behind this premise is best understood by analyzing the relationship
between the parties. Insurers enjoy several advantages over the in-
101. See Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d
940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 977 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988);
Gerrish, 754 F. Supp. 358; A/U, 799 P.2d at 1259; BroadweU, 528 A.2d at 78.
102. Continental Ins. Cos., 842 F.2d 977; Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d
940; see supra text accompanying note 65.
103. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp.
1334, 1340 (D.D.C. 1986) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 1341.
105. Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 837, 843 (M.15. Fla.
1990) (citing Miller v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 186-87 (5th Cir.
1979) (stating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act "precludes the application of federal
laws if, as a result, laws of a state regulating insurance would be invalidated, im-
paired or superseded")).
106. See, e.g., Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting that New York gives the terms of an insurance policy "a natural and
reasonable meaning"); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that "under Missouri law [t]he rules of
construction applicable to insurance contracts require that the language used be given
its plain meaning"); AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (en
banc) (finding that California law interprets the terms in an insurance policy in their
.ordinary and popular sense").
sured.'" For example, the language is usually crafted and fixed by the
insurer because it is within the insurer's area of expertise." In addi-
tion, they assess the risk and decide what premiums should be
charged.' The relationship is best characterized as one of patently un-
equal bargaining positions or adhesion."' Therefore, many states ad-
here to a posture that if the terms within a CGL policy are ambiguous,
they will be construed in the manner most favorable to the hypothetical
layman who purchased the policy."' If, however, the terms manifest
an unambiguous technical meaning, then those terms are construed
technically."'
The insurers argue that "damages" is an unambiguous term that has a
recognized technical meaning within the context of a CGL policy."
Further, they assert that their notion of a technical meaning is rein-
forced by the usage of the word "legally" preceding damages."' Insur-
ers conclude that this construction indicates that there is a distinction
between legal costs and equitable costs."5 The insurers conclude that
legal costs are compensable items under the provision and that equita-
107. AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1265.
108. Id.
109. Id,
110. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 350 (1971) (where the
very title Comprehensive General Liability Insurance conveys to the buyer an expecta-
tion of full and complete coverage).
111. See Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 754 F. Supp. 358, 367-68
(D. Vt. 1990); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp
1359, 1362 (D. Del. 1987); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430,
431 (D. Md. 1986); AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1265. In AU, the court recognized that
in some instances ambiguities in insurance policies need not be strictly construed
against the insurer if the insured possessed legal sophistication and substantial bar-
gaining power. It is noteworthy that while the court acknowledged that FMC pos-
sessed these qualities, it refused "to depart from ordinary principles of interpretation."
AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1265.
112. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
Inc., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (Missouri law states that "[i]f the language is
unambiguous the policy must be enforced according to such language"); Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (construing Florida law to
indicate that since an insurance policy is a contract, its unambiguous terms will be
deemed in effect and govern coverage issues).
113. See Continental Ins. Co., 842 F.2d at 985 (recognizing that outside of the
insurance context the term could be considered ambiguous, but stating, "In the insur-
ance context, however, the term 'damages' is not ambiguous, and the plain meaning
of the term 'damages' as used in the insurance context refers to legal damages and
does not include equitable monetary relief.").
114. Id. at 985-86. See also Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., Ltd., 804 F.2d 1325,
1327 (4th Cir. 1986); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 224 F.2d at 503; Maryland Casualty
Co., 643 F. Supp. at 434-35.
115. Maryland Casualty Co., 643 F. Supp. at 434-35.
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ble costs are excluded."' They reason that because cleanup costs con-
stitute equitable relief, such costs fall outside of the coverage provided
by the C;L."7
On the other hand, proponents of the insureds' position do not agree
that the term "damages" is limited to a technical meaning."8 They ar-
gue that this difference of opinion demonstrates that the term is ambig-
uous and consequently must be construed in favor of what the insured
understood it to mean when the contract was formed."' This argu-
ment rests on the unequal nature of the relationship between the par-
ties, as well as the expectations created by the terms "comprehensive"
and "general."' Therefore, if the insurer wishes to unambiguously ex-
clude equitable costs, he could draft the language in that manner or add
an exclusionary provision for greater clarity. 2' However, if the lan-
guage is ambiguous and exclusions are absent, most courts protect the
insureds' expectation of coverage instead of finding a technical
meaning.'" Thus, it is necessary to analyze whether damages should
be afforded a plain or technical meaning.
B. Damages-A Plain Meaning
The insurers, and the courts sympathetic to their viewpoint, choose
to construe "damages" as an unambiguous term with an accepted tech-
nical meaning within the context of the insurance policy." This posi-
116. Id,
117. Id.
118. See Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d
940, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (adhering to a "common and ordinary understanding of
damages"); Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 775 F. Supp. 718, 724-25 (D. Vt. 1991); AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799
P.2d 1253, 1262-63 (Cal. 1990) (en banc); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 842-43 (Mich. App. 1983).
119. Village of MorrisvilUe Water & Light Dep't, 775 F. Supp. at 724-25. See also
AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1267-68. The court relied on California Civil Code § 1636
which mandates that the "mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is
formed governs interpretation." -Id. at 1264.
120. See KEETON, supra note 110.
121. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
123. See Grishan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1991); Conti-
nental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d. 977 (8th Cir.
1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash.
1988); Verhin, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. M. 1988);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986).
tion is challenged by the insured parties who assert that "damages" is
ambiguous both inside and outside of the insurance policy context and
thus should be construed according to its plain meaning as understood
by the buyer of the policy." The insureds, and the courts ruling in
their favor, have put forth various arguments in support of their conten-
tion.
The first argument maintains that the term "damages" is not defined
in the CGL policies.25 Some of the CGLs did include language that
purported to define "damages," but courts have noted that this language
should not -be viewed as a limitation." These courts characterized the
wording as simply indicating that the term "damages" may include cer-
tain items.'27 The policies that were sold to IPC in fact did not include
any definitive language regarding the term "damages."
The term "damages" remains largely undefined in the CGL policy con-
text, and its interpretation has been subjected to a state-by-state analy-
sis." The current debate between insurers and their insureds, and the
resultant disagreement among courts regarding a consensus definition
of "damages," is indicative of the ambiguity inherent in the term." It
can be argued that if the courts cannot agree upon a universal defini-
tion of "damages," then the term is ambiguous and open to various
interpretations. Therefore, the insureds maintain that since "damages" is
a term susceptible to more than one plain interpretation, then the
124. Some states describe the buyer of the policy as an "ordinary businessman." See
Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (2d Cir. 1989)
(construing New York law). Other states are more liberal in their characterization.
See Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., .785 S.W.2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (construing
Missouri law and characterizing the buyer as "the average lay person"); AIU Ins. Co.
v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (construing California law and describ-
ing the buyer as a layman).
125. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940,
943 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
126. See AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1259 n.3; New Castle County v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987).
127. See New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365-66. See also Independent Petro-
chemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
policies that were sold to IPC did not include any definitive language regarding the
term "damages." Id.
128. Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 837, 841 n. 4 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (some jurisdictions in analyzing damages issues "rest solely on the interpreta-
tion of state law").
129. Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 745
(W.D. Wash. 1988) ("Since the term 'damages' has an 'accepted technical meaning in
law,' it should be given effect according to its plain meaning; that is, legal damages,
not including equitable relief."); with New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365-66
("[An ordinary definition of the word 'damages' makes no distinction between actions
at law and actions in equity.").
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meaning adopted must be the one "most favorable to the insured." "
In United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.,3' Michigan
recognized the obligation to defend the insured under the CGL policy
rested on the definition of "damages.""s In Aviex, the insurer sought
declaratory judgment regarding its obligation to reimburse the insured
for corrective measures the insured was compelled to undertake by the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources." The CGL policy did not
define "damages," but it did include language excluding any damages to
"property owned by the insured."" Although the court found the
insurer's position persuasive, the court nevertheless found that cover-
age existed.' The court rejected the insurer's viewpoint because it
interpreted "damages" too narrowly. The court concluded that the
state could have sued for "traditional 'damages,'" which would have
been covered, rather than compel the polluter to engage in a cleanup of
the site.' 7 Therefore, it was a "merely fortuitous" choice by the state
and should not impact coverage." Predictably, this reasoning met
with pointed criticism by insurers.'39
The issue of coverage was more fully explored in New Castle County
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.' The County moved for a
declaratory judgment seeking indemnification for the remedial steps
that it was compelled to undertake to clean up the pollution. The court
agreed with the County and adopted a broader definition of "damag-
130. Krornbach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
131. 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. App. 1983).
132. Id. at 842.
133. Id. at 840.
134. Id, The CGL policies purchased by NEPACCO and IPC did not contain the
exclusion noted in Aviex. See Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1988).
135. Aviex, 336 N.W.2d at 842-43.
136. Id (rejecting the analysis offered in Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224
F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955) that found a cause of action for damages was a "legal" ac-
tion).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 843. The court relied on Michigan's statutory language that provided the
State with the means to recover "injuries done to the natural resources of the state."
Id,
139. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Md. 1986)
("To adopt the reasoning of the Aviex decision is to adopt no reasoning at all.").
140. 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987).
es."4' While the policies did include language purporting to define the
term, the court characterized those descriptions as being of little
help.'4
The New Castle court recounted that Delaware adheres to the ordi-
nary, usual meaning of the terms in an insurance policy whenever pos-
sible.' It is significant that the New Castle court used the definition
found in Webster's Dictionary,'" whereas the insurers often point to a
definition of damages as stated in Black's Law Dictionary.'" The
court noted that the common definition does not recognize the distinc-
tion "between actions at law and actions in equity."" Thus, the court
concluded that according to Delaware law, which adheres to a plain
meaning as understood by the insured, the definition provided by
Webster's better reflected the insured's expectations."'
The California Supreme Court also addressed the issue of damages in
AIU Insurance Co., holding that a technical meaning does not exist
within CGL policies.'" The court stated that California law construes
insurance "policy language according to the mutual intentions of the
parties and its 'plain and ordinary' meaning, resolving ambiguities in
favor of coverage."' Based on this pro-insured premise, the court rea-
soned that the court of appeal erred when it departed from this narrow
inquiry. The court of appeal sought to explore public policy consider-
ations and found that a technical meaning existed.'"
141. Id. at 1364-65 (relying on Aviex analysis).
142. Id. at 1365. See also supra note 126 and accompanying text
143. New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365 (citing Johnson v. Tally Ho, Inc., 303
A.2d 677, 679 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)).
144. Id. "The estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained-
compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by a
violation of a legal right." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571
(1971).
145. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955)
(relying on the definition found in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (3d ed.) to indicate
that a technical meaning for damages was accepted at law).
146. New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365. See also AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp.,
799 P.2d 1253, 1266 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) ("California has generally abandoned the
traditional distinction between courts of equity and courts of law ... ."); Village of
Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 775 F. Supp.
718, 728 (D. Vt 1991) (stating that "Vermont has abolished the antiquated distinction
between legal and equitable claims").
147. New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
148. 799 P.2d 1253, 1259 (Cal. 1990) (en banc).
149. Id See also Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 185 S.W. 2d 728, 731 (Mo.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (construing Missouri law).
150. AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1262. The Supreme Court followed a decidedly nar-
row inquiry because it concluded that Congress and the Legislature had already made
the "relevant public policy determinations." Thus, the court viewed its task as deter-
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In contrast to the stance taken by the lower court, the California Su-
preme Court steadfastly adhered to this premise even when confronted
with evidence that the insured was considerably more informed than a
typical party purchasing a CGL policy would be."5' The intent factor
proved dispositive to the court. Therefore, it held that the relevant in-
quiry remained whether evidence existed at the time of contracting that
the insurer had cause to believe that the insured "understood policy
language in any technical or restrictive manner.""5 This analysis con-
siders the mind set of the insured and the court concluded that the
denial of insurance coverage based on whether the plaintiff proceeded
in equity rather than law would not be a factor weighed by the insured
at the time of contracting.'"
The decision rendered in Federal Insurance Co. v. Susquehanna
Broadcasting Co."s underscores the fact that many states ascribe vary-
ing interpretations to the term "damages." " In Susquehanna, the
court refused to be drawn into a debate as to whether CERCLA re-
sponse costs were equitable or legal -in nature." Further, the court
found that the term "damages" has a technical meaning which should
be recognized within the CGL policy context.' Nonetheless, the court
found that Pennsylvania law mandates that "where an injury is repara-
ble, damages consist of the cost of repair or restoration. "" Therefore,
the court held that the CERCLA response costs sought would constitute
mining whether coverage existed based on the policy's language and not grounded in
public policy concerns. Id.
151. Id. at 1265. FMC Corp. operates a subsidiary that drafts identical CGL policies
to those it purchased from AMU. Id
152. Id. This approach is in sharp contrast to Pennsylvania where the term damages
had a technical meaning. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727
F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (recognizing approaches such as the one adhered
to in AU where the buyer's reasonable expectations are taken into account, but dis-
missing that mode of inquiry because it found that a technical meaning existed).
153. AU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1266-67 (citing Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior
Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the insureds would suffer
an "unexpected, if not incomprehensible shock" if coverage was denied simply be-
cause the action was brought in equity as opposed to in law)).
154. 727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
155. Susquehanna, 727 F. Supp at 173-74 (dismissing other states' interpretations
and using Pennsylvania law to determine response costs are recoverable as an item
of damages).
156. Id.
157. Id, at 174.
158. Id. (citing Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 560 A.2d 809, 813 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (en banc)).
damages, and were compensable under the CGL policies." This case
bolsters the argument that the term itself is ambiguous and should be
afforded a plain meaning."®
C. Damages-A Technical Meaning
The proponents of a technical meaning found support for their con-
tention that damages are afforded an unambiguous meaning within the
insurance context from a series of older cases outside the hazardous
waste scenario. For example, in Desrochers v. New York Casualty
Co., 6' the court examined the issue of whether a comprehensive per-
sonal liability policy, which provided coverage for damages, included
equitable relief." In Desrochers, the insured was ordered to spend the
sums necessary to remove an obstruction that caused flooding of ad-
joining land. The court held that the costs resulting from compliance
with the injunction did not constitute the type of damages covered
under the policy." The court reasoned that "[diamages are recom-
pense for injuries sustained... and are remedial, not preventative.""
The court found no connection between costs associated with
compliance with the injunction and actual damages. While the court
asserted that a reasonable man in the position of the insured would not
interpret equitable costs as constituting damages, the court did not
elaborate further upon this assertion."
The distinction between equitable and legal claims was further ad-
vanced in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Hanna." The underlying
litigation arose when boulders and other objects upset from Hanna's
property landed on adjoining property due to the effects of storms and
159. Id (citing Lutz v. Chromatex Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 417 (M.D. Pa. 1989)). The
court noted that a limitation on amounts recovered exists. That figure must be less
than the value of the property. Id. (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 989 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Heaney, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (stating the record clearly showed that the cost of clean-
ing up was less than the value of the government's interest in the property and
therefore was the proper measure of damages)). See also Jack L. Baker Cos. v.
Pasley Mfr. and Dlstrib. Co., 413 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Mo. 1967) (citing Curtis v. Fruin-
Calnon Contracting Co., 253 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Mo. 1952) (stating "where damaged
property can be restored to its former condition at a cost less than the diminution in
volume, the cost of restoration is the proper recovery")).
160. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
161. 106 A.2d 196 (N.H. 1954).
162. Id. at 198. The comprehensive personal liability policy was essentially similar
to comprehensive general liability policies.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES §§ 2, 29 (9th ed.)).
165. I& at 199.
166. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
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high tides."7 The subsequent action was injunctive and did not include
money damages.'6 The Hannas requested Aetna's defense, but Aetna
refused, noting that injunctive relief was not covered under the terms of
the policy." Subsequently, the Hannas were found liable.70 Instead
of complying with the order, the Hannas ignored it. The case was trans-
ferred to the "law side of the Court,"7' where they were assessed non-
compliance damages. Thereafter, the Hannas commenced an action in
district court in order to recover, among other things, the two thousand
dollars they spent to satisfy the mandatory injunction. The district
court awarded the Hannas damages in the amount of $6872.75, and
Aetna appealed.m
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the lower court's decision with
direction to dismiss the Hannas' suit and enter final judgment for
Aetna.74 The district court fashioned its holding on the premise that
the determinative issue regarding coverage was whether the injury cre-
ated an obligation by law for the insured as opposed to which remedy
the injured sought to elect. 7 " The circuit court disagreed and proceed-
ed to explain that the language of the contract must be strictly read to
determine whether coverage exists.7 " The court analyzed the language
and noted that the contract did not contain any reference to covering
mandatory injunction costs." The Hanna court asserted that damages
has an "accepted technical meaning in law" which does not include in-
junctive relief." Further, the court recounted Florida law as addition-
167. Id. at 500.
168. Id. at 500-01.
169. Id. at 501. Accordingly, the Hannas employed counsel and undertook their own
defense. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 506. Modernly, this distinction between an equity side and a legal side
has largely faded, if not totally abolished, thus reducing the argument's effectiveness.
See Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
775 F. Supp. 718, 725 (D. Vt. 1991) ("Vermont has abolished the antiquated distinction
between legal and equitable claims . . . .")A AU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d
1253, 1266 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) ("California has generally abandoned the traditional
distinction between courts of equity and courts of law.").
172. Hanmz, 224 F.2d at 502.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. Id. at 502-03.
176. Id. at 603.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court relied on damages as defined in the third edition of Black's Law
al evidence of the lack of coverage.'9 The court noted that the mea-
sure of damages is calculated by subtracting the value of the land be-
fore the injury and the value after the inury. The court concluded that
it was entirely possible that the presence of the Hanna boulders may
have in fact made the land more valuable, thus pointing out the signifi-
cance of choosing the appropriate cause of action and illustrating the
distinction between a cause of action grounded in law versus equity.'O
While these cases breathed life into the ancient distinction between
law and equity, the court in Maryland Casualty v. Armco applied this
"black letter" law to CERCLA and CGL policies.s" In an action brought
against a hazardous waste handler and disposer, the EPA proceeded
under the so-called cleanup provision in CERCLA Section
9607(a)(4)(A)." Armco dumped waste at a site and caused hazardous
substances to leak into local tributaries. Armco then hired an outside
contractor to dispose of the wastes. The contractor, however, per-
formed the task improperly, which led to even more problems."
The court applied Maryland law, which adheres to the rule that am-
biguous language within an insurance policy should be construed
against the insurer."' The court granted Maryland Casualty's motion
for summary judgment and sided with the notion that damages have a
technical "black letter" meaning within the insurance context and that
equitable relief under Section 9607(a)(4)(A) fell outside that narrow
definition."
Dictionary in order to conclude that damages had an accepted technical meaning in
law.
179. Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
180. Id. at 502-03. This notion relied on by insurers was also recognized by the
court in A/U. AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1273 (Cal. 1990) (en banc).
Hoiever, the AU court rejected its application and noted that "recovery of tort dam-
ages is not invariably limited by the value of damaged property." Id.
181. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986).
182. Id at 431. The court recounted that the EPA complaint specified that §
9607(a)(4)(A) would be used and thus Armco would be "strictly liable for 'all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a state.'"
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 907(a)(4)(A)). The facts surrounding the underlying action
were typical of many hazardous waste problems. Id.
183. 1&
184. Id. The court applied Maryland law because the contracts in question were
signed in Maryland. Id, See also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
185. Armco, 643 F. Supp. at 435. The court and the insurer acknowledged that the
government could have brought suit under the "damages" provision of CERCLA, Title
42, § 9607(a)(4)(C) of the United States Code. However, the government elected not
to bring a "damages" suit. This government strategy provides further support for the
court's conclusion that the existence of different, specific remedies indicates that the
insurer is only "obligated to defend or indemnify real law suits, not hypothetical
ones." Id. at 434.
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Initially, the court seemed to be persuaded by a recommendation in a
companion case, United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.,
which suggested a jury trial would be inappropriate because of the equi-
table nature of the action.'87 This viewpoint bolstered the notion that a
clear division existed between equitable and legal proceedings. Howev-
er, the proponent of the recommendation wavered and adopted the
opposite holding set forth in United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers In-
surance Co., which effectively blurred the legal/equity distinction.
The Armco court reviewed the Aviex decision critically. The court con-
cluded that the Aviex court failed to recognize that the nature of the
complaint is important to the insurer. In effect, the Aviex court ignored
the insurer's right to view the complaint and assess whether an obliga-
tion exists to defend and indemnify."
The Armco court rejected another Aviex argument that the costs of
cleanup were in "essence" governmental claims for money, as opposed
to the traditional equity actions that seek purely injunctive relief."
The court concluded that the Aviex logic would unreasonably subject
insurers to potential areas of coverage that were outside the terms of
the policy. 9' Instead, the court sided with Hanna, and recognized that
a line has to be drawn between coverage and noncoverage." The
court acknowledged that as "[a]rbitrary as it may appear, Maryland
Casualty is entitled to the benefit of its bargain.""
It is settled that the issue of whether "damages" is afforded a plain or
technical meaning is a matter of state law. Against this backdrop, it is
imperative to analyze the application of Missouri insurance contract law
that was implemented by the Eighth Circuit and the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Courts.
186. No. 82-0983-CV-W-5 (W.D. Mo.). Maryland Casualty was not a party in this ac-
tion but its insured Armco was a defendant. Maryland Casualty sought a declaratory
judgment and elected to bring the action in Maryland under diversity jurisdiction. The
court then applied Maryland law in Maryland Casualty. Id,
187. Aroo, 643 F. Supp. at 432-33 (a special master was appointed and delivered
this recommendation which the judge then approved).
188. 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. App. 1988) (rejecting a narrow interpretation of
"damages").
189. Armco, 643 F. Supp. at 434.
190. l at 434-35.
191. Id. at 435.
192. Id.
193. Id
IV. NEPACCO-AN INSURER'S VICTORY
As expected, the devastation of Times Beach, Missouri produced
much litigation."M The high profile status of the disaster made the out-
come of the litigation even more significant to both insurers and
insureds.'95 This Section analyzes the methodology the Eighth Circuit
used on rehearing, en banc, to arrive at a five to three decision, revers-
ing the previous holding which concluded that CGL policies cover
cleanup costs.1"
A. Facts and Procedural History
NEPACCO was a producer of the chemical hexachlorophene. Produc-
tion of hexachlorophene produced several hazardous substances includ-
ing the substance dioxin. In July 1971, NEPACCO dumped eighty-five
fifty-five-gallon drums in a trench. Some of those drums leaked and
broke open, leaving a strong odor at the site for several months. Later
in 1971, NEPACCO consulted IPC to dispose of more dioxin-contami-
nated waste. IPC in turn hired Russell Bliss, an independent contractor,
to remove the waste. Bliss was unaware of the toxic nature of the
waste, and he mixed it with waste oil. He sprayed this mixture as a
dust suppressant in various areas of Missouri. 1 7 Subsequently, the
EPA discovered large levels of dioxin in the soil at the first dumpsite.
This led to a cleanup effort and the eventual evacuation of Times
Beach."'
The EPA sought to recover the cleanup costs from NEPACCO and
194. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp.
1334, 1339-40 (D.D.C. 1986) (Fifty-seven Civil actions involving over 1600 claimants
have been filed in other courts against IPC).
195. Wade Lambert & Jonathan Moses, Insurers Lose Round Over Cleanup Costs,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1991, at B7 (presenting a current estimate of the costs);
Barnaby J. Feder, Business and the Law: The Insurer's Role In Waste Cleanup, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at D2 ("By some estimates, more than $500 billion is at stake.").
196. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842
F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (affirming in part and reversing in part the district
court's decision).
197. Id. at 979.
198. In an ironic twist, the EPA recently reassessed its position as to the toxicity
of dioxin. Dr. Vernon N. Houk, the Assistant Surgeon General and Director of the
Center for Environmental Health and Injury Control at the Center for Disease Control
went so far as to say that "[gliven what we now know about this chemical's toxicity
and its effects on human health, it looks as though the evacuation [of Times Beach]
was unnecessary." Keith Schneider, U.S. Backing Away From Saying Dioxin Is A
Deadly Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1991, at Al.
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other responsible parties under CERCLA Section 9607(a)(4)(A)."
NEPACCO had previously purchased CGL policies which were in force
during the period when the pollution and accompanying damage oc-
curred.' Therefore, NEPACCO, which was liable under Section
9607(a)(4)(A), sought defense and indemnification from its insurer
based on the CGL policy. The insurer brought suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the terms of the policy did not require it to defend
NEPACCO.nI The district court granted summary judgment for the in-
surer' and the matter was heard on appeal by the circuit court which
affirmed in part and reversed on the crucial damages construction is-
sue.
B. The NEPACCO Rehearing En Banc
Circuit Judge McMillian, who dissented in the first NEPACCO hearing
at the circuit level, spoke for the majority upon rehearing. First, the
court noted that Missouri law governed the inquiry regarding the con-
struction of terms within a CGL policy.' Therefore, the primary issue
before the court was whether to construe the term "damages" technical-
ly and thus preclude coverage by Continental under the CGL policy, or
whether to construe it ambiguously and therefore obligate Continental
to indenuify.'
1. Missouri's Law Regarding Insurance Policy Interpretation
The CGL policies purchased by NEPACCO contained standard form
199. Continental, 842 F.2d at 980.
200. Id. at 979. During the period when the hazardous wastes were improperly
disposed of by Bliss, NEPACCO was covered by three CGL insurance policies. Two
of the policies contained pollution exclusion provisions that did not factor into the
court's discussion and analysis of the damages issue. Id.
201. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1987).
202. Id. at 1184.
203. Id. The court reversed on the damages issue and concluded that the CGL
policies did not include cleanup costs. Id. at 1192. However, this opinion was with-
drawn and vacated upon the granting of rehearing en banc. Continental Ins. Co. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem Co., 842 F.2d 977, 979 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988).
204. Continental, 842 F.2d at 985 (agreeing with the district court that Missouri law
governs the interpretation of the CGL policies because the "state has the most signif-
icant relation with the negotiation and terms of the insurance contract").
205. Id. at 983.
language and did not define the term "damages. " ' Missouri case law
is well settled regarding ambiguity and steadfastly construes "any ambi-
guity in the policy... against the insurance company."' Further, case
law indicates that the terms used in the policy must be afforded their
plain meaning, which should be consistent with the reasonable expecta-
tions and intent of the parties.' However, in the event of a conflict
between the technical definition of a term and the meaning that would
be understood by the average layman, the layman's understanding will
govern the contract unless it plainly appears that the technical meaning
was intended.' Therefore, Missouri case law is premised upon finding
policy coverage and abhorring forfeiture.1
Against this backdrop, which could be fairly characterized as pro-
insured, the NEPACCO court analyzed the term "damages" present in
the CGL policy and concluded that it had a technical meaning. " ' The
court conceded that outside of the insurance context the term is ambig-
uous and noted that a lay "dictionary definition does not distinguish
between legal damages and equitable monetary relief."12 Despite this
acknowledgment, the court elected to follow Armco, which held that
inside the insurance context, "damages" is afforded a technical unam-
biguous meaning."3 It is significant that the Hanna decision, which
was outside of the hazardous waste scenario, was the basis of the
Armco decision and played a major role in the NEPACCO holding.
The NEPACCO court subscribed to the notion that under "black let-
ter insurance law," claims rooted in equity do not constitute "damages"
claims that are recognized under CGL policies." Thus, the court con-
cluded that there was no ambiguity in the language. However, the court
206. Id. at 979-80 (policies define property damage, but do not define "damages").
207. Kissel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497, 507 (Mo. 1964).
208. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982); see also
Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
209. Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 27 (Mo. 1969); see also Avondale
Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir. 1989) (New York
law viewed the policy buyer as an "ordinary businessman" and still found that he
would reasonably expect the CGL policy to cover damages).
210. Krombach, 785 S.W.2d at 731 (citing Western v. Royal Indem. Co., 577 S.W.2d
623, 626 (Mo. 1979) (en banc)).
211. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842
F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
212. Id. at 985 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571
(1971)).
213. Id. at 985-86. Accord Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F.
Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp.
430, 432 (D. Md. 1986).
214. See Continenta, 842 F.2d at 986 (citations omitted); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.
v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1955); Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co.,
106 A.2d 196, 198-99 (N.H. 1954).
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also cited cases that reached the opposite conclusion regarding the
meaning of damages in CGLs." In these cases, the courts reasoned
that sufficient ambiguity existed and that according to state insurance
law interpretation, ambiguities must be construed in favor of the in-
sured." Recognizing that different courts might differ in their defini-
tion of "damages," the Eighth Circuit may have been overly conclusory
in stating that "black letter insurance law" is clear on the subject.
The NEPACCO court further argued that the CGL policy language
was intended to limit liability by excluding equitable claims." This no-
tion presupposes the conclusion that "damages" only has one definition
within the insurance context. The disagreement among the various
courts dealing with this question suggests that legal experts think oth-
erwise, to say nothing of the layperson who purchased the policy."8
2. The Significance of CERCLA Providing a Cause of Action
for Cleanup Cost Recovery and a Separate Cause of Action for
Damages
The NEPACCO court sought to buttress its argument that damages
should be afforded a technical meaning, as the Hanna court suggested,
by focusing on the choices of causes of action provided under
CERCLA" The court reasoned that the different CERCLA clauses al-
low a plaintiff to choose a cause of action based on favorable calcula-
tions and not "mere fortuity" as the Aviex holding suggested.' ° The
potential for large variations in eventual liability led the court to con-
215. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359,
1365-67 (D. Del 1987); United States Aviex v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 628
A2d 76, 82-83 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1987).
216. See, e.g., New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365.
217. Continental, 842 F.2d at 986 (stating that an expanded "reading of the term
'damages' . . . would render the term 'all sums' virtually meaningless").
218. Compare New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365 (reasoning that "this court
finds that the 'legal, technical' interpretation of the word 'damages' . . . is inappro-
priate under Delaware law") with Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp.
430, 432 (D. Md. 1986) (stating that black letter insurance law mandates that
"damages" are not an equitable form of relief and are not covered under CGL poli-
cies).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C).
220. Continental, 842 F.2d at 986-87 (noting that an action in damages is limited to
a figure equal to or less than the value of the property whereas an action for clean-
up costs could potentially far exceed the value of the property).
clude that the two separate CERCLA clauses suggest a statutory recog-
nition of the distinction between legal damages and equitable cleanup
costs."
Next, the NEPACCO court recounted Missouri law governing the
calculation of damages. In Jack L. Baker Cos. v. Pasley Manufacturing
and Distributing Cos.,' the court stated that the measurement of
damages to real property is the lesser of either the difference in value
prior to and after the injury occurred, or the cost of rehabilitating the
land to its pre-damaged state.'m Based on this definition, the court in
NEPACCO reasoned that an action for damages served as a cap on
recovery and that the "mere fortuity" argument failed to recognize the
distinction between cleanup costs and damage to natural resources. '
Therefore, the court concluded thit CERCLA provided alternative
causes of action, and that the choice of the clause under which to pro-
ceed might impact the size of the award, thereby indicating whether the
insurer or the insured was liable under the CGL policy.'
3. The Impact of the NEPACCO Decision
NEPACCO was an important holding that served to legitimize the
Armco decision. Without the NEPACCO court's support, Armco could
have been isolated, with its persuasive value muted.' However, the
high profile nature of Times Beach,"' coupled with the history of Mis-
souri insurance contract law favoring coverage and adhering to a non-
technical meaning of insurance policy terms, made NEPACCO a holding
that was embraced by insurers and might have led to unlikely decisions
in states where insurance contract law was decidedly pro-insured.
221. Id, at 987.
222. 413 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1967).
223. Id, at 273-74. Note, however, that this case did not deal with a hazardous
waste scenario.
224. Continental, 842 F.2d at 987. See also, Verlan, Ltd. v. John L Armitage & Co.,
695 F. Supp. 950, 955 (N.D. IlM. 1988) (to date, 'most government actions have sought
recovery of response costs, rather than damages").
225. Continental, 842 F.2d at 987.
226. The Armco holding was the first to apply the Hanna reasoning to the haz-
ardous waste and CGL policy question. As the dissent in NEPACCO indicated, the
Maryland laws governing insurance policy interpretation are "inconsistent with estab-
lished Missouri law.- Continental, 842 F.2d at 989 (Heaney, J., concurring and dis-
senting). The dissent characterized Maryland law as adhering to the narrow and
technical definitions of "damages." Id, (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
227. Contaminated Toum is Relegated to History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1985, at 26
(discussing the Times Beach, Mo., community that was ruined by toxic waste and
subsequently disincorporated).
228. See, e.g., Grisham v..Commercial Union Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.
1991). The district court noted that Arkansas law is substantially similar to Missouri
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Armed with the NEPACCO result, many insurers sought to obtain de-
claratory judgments in order to confirm that they had no duty to defend
or indemnify a hazardous waste producer or handler. 9
The NEPACCO holding also dealt with the issue of who would pay
for the cleanup costs incurred by the government once insurers were
excused from liability. The insured parties had far fewer resources to
shoulder the burden of reimbursing the government than their insur-
ers.' With the indemnification issue settled in NEPACCO, the ques-
tion of who will pay back the government becomes more troubling.
CERCLA was intended to provide the government with a mechanism to
remedy hazardous waste problems and hold responsible parties lia-
ble.' Parties in violation would be penalized, which would replenish
the government's coffers and allow regulating efforts to continue.232
Prudently, the hazardous waste producers and handlers sought to limit
their risk by purchasing insurance. The NEPACCO holding frustrated
that effort and rendered the once insured, liable.'
The most damaging effect associated with the NEPACCO holding may
be a decline in government cleanup of hazardous waste sites.' The
financial constraints felt by the federal government are well document-
ed, and necessarily impact the ability of the EPA to undertake cleanup
efforts, especially in light of the real possibility that the liable party
law regarding insurance policy interpretation and therefore, adopted a construction
favoring the insured party. Thus, the court followed the NEPACCO holding that
"damages" was a technical term. Id.
229. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F.Supp.
437, 438 (D. Kan. 1990); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252,
1252 (D. Md. 1989); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950, 951
(N.D. IM. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 743
(N.D. Wash. 1988).
230. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 979 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (NEPACCO ceased doing business in 1974). But
see Barnaby J. Feder, Business and the Law; The Insurer's Role In Waste Cleanup,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1991, at D2 (noting that if insurers are liable, bankruptcies would
become commonplace).
231. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
232. See Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Re-
sponse Costs: The Limits of "Damages" In Comprehensive General Liability Policies,
16 ECOLOGY LQ. 755 (1989).
233. See Continental, 842 F.2d at 979.
234. The insureds would be hard pressed to be able to afford these costs, thus
placing the costs back on the government. See Continental, 842 F.2d at 979
(NEPACCO ceased operations and had no resources to compensate the government).
(according to NEPACCO) may never be able to repay the govern-
ment.' Some have argued that the insurers never intended to insure
this kind of massive potential liability and that the insurance industry
could not weather a storm as violent as liability for hazardous waste
cleanup costs.' In contrast, it seems likely that the insured parties
will not be able to reimburse the government to any meaningful degree.
It also strikes a note of unfairness because the parties now liable acted
prudently, by procuring insurance to limit their risk.23
V. IPC-DISMANTLING NEPACCO
While the Eighth Circuit was considering the NEPACCO case, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court was hearing Independent Petro-
chemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.' Both cases arose
from the Times Beach, Missouri dioxin disaster and share substantially
relevant facts.' Each circuit court faced the identical task of constru-
ing Missouri insurance contract law, yet the circuits disagreed in their
holdings. This Section analyzes the District of Columbia's Circuit Court
holding and explores its persuasive value as a "foreign" circuit disagree-
ing with a "home" circuit's interpretation of state law.
A. Facts and Procedural History
IPC is in the business of marketing petrochemicals in Missouri. In
1971, IPC assisted NEPACCO in the removal of waste products. IPC
hired Russell Bliss who improperly disposed of the waste leading to
contamination that was cleaned up by the United States Government
and the State of Missouri.'o In 1983, Missouri sued IPC to recover its
cleanup expenditures under Section 9607(a)(4)(A). 4 Two weeks prior
to that action, IPC brought an action for declaratory judgment in the
District of Columbia District Court. 2 IPC sought a ruling that would
235. Id.
236. Wade Lambert & Jonathan Moses, Insurers Lose Round Over Cleanup Costs,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1991, at B7.
237. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. See also Independent Petrochemical
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D.D.C. 1987) (IPC's
parent company, Charter Oil Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection).
238. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 654 F. Supp. at 1339.
239. NEPACCO was covered by three CGL policies, two of which contained pollu-
tion exclusion clauses. Continental, 842 F.2d at 979. The IPC policies did not contain
these clauses.
240. Independent Petrochemical, 654 F. Supp. at 1339.
241. Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., No. 83-2670-C, 1984 WL 2921
(E.D. Mo. 1984).
242. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 654 F. Supp. at 1342. IPC selected the Dis-
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find that its CGL insurance policies covered the cleanup costs sought
by Missouri and the United States.'
The district court wrestled with the complex issue of cleanup costs,
and in a Memorandum Decision dated May 2, 1986, the court found that
Missouri law required the insurers to indemnify IPC for the cleanup
costs, finding that the cleanup costs constituted damages." This clear
victory for the insured parties dissolved in 1988 when the Eighth Circuit
held that Missouri law did not recognize cleanup costs as damages cov-
ered under CGL insurance policies. 5 In an abrupt reversal, the Dis-
trict of Columbia district court yielded to the precedent set by the
"home circuit" and granted the insurers partial summary judgment.'
The insureds appealed the ruling and the District of Columbia Circuit
Court reversed on the critical issue of damages and affirmed on other
grounds."?
B. The IPC Reasoning
The IPC court took special care to justify its refusal to defer to the
"home circuit's" opinion.' The court recognized that if it reached a
result different from the NEPACCO court, that result would create a
split among the circuits that could only be settled by the United States
Supreme Court.2' That eventuality was unlikely because the interpre-
tation of insurance policies has been an area subject to state law con-
struction rather than federal guidelines.' ° The court acknowledged
these factors, but elected not to defer to the Eighth Circuit's assess-
ment of Missouri law." ' Armed with a directive from Abex Corp. v.
trict of Columbia as the forum for litigation because of past favorable holdings re-
garding trigger of coverage issues. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing coverage based on the multiple-
trigger theory).
243. The United States action against IPC was based on 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) and
IPC was found jointly and severally liable for cleanup cost reimbursement. See United
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
244. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 654 F. Supp. at 1359.
245. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842
F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
246. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 654 F. Supp. at 1339.
247. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940,
948 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
248. Id. at 944.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
251. The damages issue had not been dealt with by the Missouri Supreme Court
Maryland Casualty Co.,' the court refused to be charged with "blind
adherence" to the NEPACCO court.' Instead the court proceeded to
analyze Missouri law because it felt that the Eighth Circuit "clearly
misread state law."'
The District of Columbia Circuit Court was in complete accord with
the Eighth Circuit's description of Missouri insurance law construc-
tion.' This view maintains that a technical meaning of a term within
an insurance policy that conflicts with a layperson's understanding of
that term will not be applied "unless it plainly appears that the techni-
cal meaning is intended. " ' The IPC court noted that an initial inquiry
must be made to determine whether "damages" is susceptible to more
than one plain interpretation. 7 The NEPACCO court did not make
this inquiry, but instead concluded that "damages" is afforded a techni-
cal meaning and that meaning was plainly intended.' The District of
Columbia Circuit refused to adopt the conclusory position taken by the
Eighth Circuit and noted that the term "damages" was undefined in the
policy.'s Further, the IPC court noted that for a technical meaning to
attach, it must be "consistent with the reasonable expectations, objec-
tives and intent of the parties."' Based on this understanding, the
court cited a broad definition in a layperson's dictionary which could
be considered to be reflective of a plain meaning of damages."
The IPC court further noted that the burden lay with the insurer to
show that the parties intended to be bound by the technical meaning of
a term.' States that follow this pro-insured posture, such as Missouri,
and the IPC court termed Missouri law on this matter "unsettled." Independent Petro-
chemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 944.
252. 790 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
253. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 945 ("Deference is one thing,
blind adherence quite another.").
254. Id.; see Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 125-26 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (permitting the court to not follow another circuit's holding if that court "ig-
nored clear signals emanating from the state courts" or "clearly misread state law").
255. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 945-46.
256. Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
257. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 945. According to Missouri law,
if the term is susceptible to more than one plain meaning, then the meaning "most
favorable to the insured must be adopted." Krombach, 785 S.W.2d at 731.
258. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
259. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 942.
260. Krombach, 785 S.W.2d at 731 (emphasis added).
261. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 945 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (1971)). See also New Castle County v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (1971)).
262. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 946.
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find that a "[tiechnical meaning is the exception rather than the
rule."' The approach taken by the Eighth Circuit, simply declaring
that "damages" was unambiguous within an insurance context, was at
best conclusory and at worst in conflict with state law.' Therefore,
the IPC court invoked the so-called "Abex exception" because the
NEPACCO court "clearly misread state law."'
The District of Columbia Circuit relied on the premise that the
layperson's understanding of a term is controlling when it countered
the insurer's assertion that a broad interpretation of "damages" renders
the rest of the clause as surplusage.' The court maintained that it
was reasonable for a layperson buying an insurance policy to surmise
that the term "damages" includes response costs, which would essen-
tially serve to place the injured party in the "position he would have
been in had the injurious action not occurred." 7 Yet, the court stated
that the same layperson would ordinarily understand that damages do
not include fines or penalties," Thus, the court rejected the insurer's
contention that a broad definition of "damages" would result in open-
ended liability.2s
The NEPACCO court was also persuaded by the insurer's argument
that the statutory construction of CERCLA itself provided evidence that
damages and cleanup costs were not similar causes of action.' The
IPC court dismissed this contention by noting that the Supreme Court
263. Id, See also AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1268 (Cal. 1990) (en
bane) (noting that California law "interprets policy language in its 'ordinary and
popular' sense unless the parties expressed an intent otherwise").
264. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 946.
265. Id at 945.
266. Id, at 947.
267. Id.
268. The court based this observation on definitions found in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 852, 1668 (1971) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 632, 1133
(6th ed.).
269. Indepimdent Petrochemical Corp., 244 F.2d at 947. That possibility was ex-
pressed in other cases that contended that an overly expansive interpretation could
cause insurers to be under an obligation to defend against most, if not all, suits. See
Continental Is. Cos. v. Northeastem Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-
86 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430,
434 (D. Md. 1986)
270. Continental, 842 F.2d at 986-87 (noting that CERCLA provided in 42 U.S.C. §§
9607(a)(4)(A) and 9607(a)(4)(C) for recovery of cleanup costs by governments and
.recovery of damages for injury, destruction or loss of natural resources," respective-
ly, and that some cases have ignored the distinction).
seemed to reject the notion that CERCLA provided a clear distinction
between cleanup costs and damages." Furthermore, the court noted
that several other courts characterize the cost of restoration as an ap-
propriate method of calculation in natural resource damages actions."
C. The Impact of IPC
In order to assess the impact of the IPC holding, it is necessary to
recognize what the District of Columbia Circuit court sought to accom-
plish and what it did not. The court noted that the matter of insurance
policy construction was governed by each state's particular rules of
interpretation.' The danger inherent in the NEPACCO holding was
that it appeared to correctly recount Missouri law, 4 but then "bor-
rowed" Maryland insurance contract rules in the application stage of its
analysis.' Therefore, the NEPACCO court acknowledged that Missou-
ri views technical terms within insurance policies critically, but it none-
theless applied a technical meaning.78
The IPC holding could serve to re-establish the traditional distinction
between technical meaning states and non-technical meaning states and
thus provide the insured party with a greater level of certainty. Natural-
ly, before the potential persuasive impact of IPC can be realized, the
decision and its foundations must be considered.
1. The District of Columbia Circuit as a "Foreign" Circuit
The IPC court acknowledged that it was a "foreign" circuit about to
challenge a "home" circuit's interpretation of state law.'o The court
noted that because of fears regarding forum shopping the predominate
assumption must be to defer to the expertise of the "home" circuit.7
However, the District of Columbia Circuit elected not to defer, basing
its decision on the Abex exception.2'
The IPC posture was strengthened by the district court's decision in
271. Independent Petrochemical, 944 F.2d at 946-47.
272. Id. at 947. See also Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F.
Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (quoting Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 560
A.2d 809, 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (en banc) ("where an injury is reparable, the
damage is the cost of repair or restoration . . ").
273. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 942.
274. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 842
F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
275. Id. at 985-86.
276. Id.
277. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 944.
278. Id. at 944-45.
279. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Insurance Co.' In that case, the
facts again were based on Russell Bliss' spraying of dioxin in Times
Beach, Missouri." This action reached the court under diversity juris-
diction and the defendant insurance company sought summary judg-
ment on the grounds that cleanup costs did not constitute damages
under a CGL policy.' Whereas, in 1988, the District of Columbia court
deferred to the recent NEPACCO holding,'m the Pennsylvania court
did not defer, but instead proceeded to describe and apply Missouri
law.' This was a significant decision by the court because, less than
eight months later, another Pennsylvania district court declared that
under Pennsylvania law "damages" had a legal meaning and not an
equitable meaning.'m
The Jones Truck court undertook this review of Missouri law without
the benefit of a Third Circuit case which discussed the precedential
value of a "home" circuit's interpretation of state law within that cir-
cuit.' Nonetheless, the court relied on the Abex case and then proceed-
ed to review Missouri law in much the same manner as the IPC court
and the NEPACCO court. 7 The Jones Truck court reached the same
conclusion as the District of Columbia Circuit Court and noted that the
Eighth Circuit's characterization of damages being afforded a technical
meaning was not based on Missouri case law, but was lifted from the
Fourth Circuit's application of Maryland substantive law principles.'
Therefore, the court denied the insurer's motion for summary
judgment.
In contrast, the court in Grisham v. Commercial Union Insurance
Co.,'m dealing with a damages issue within a CGL policy, refused to
entertain the insured party's contention that damages could reasonably
280. Civ. A. No. 88-5723, 1989 WL 49517 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989).
281. Id. at *1.
282. Id. at *1, *2.
283. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp.
1334 (D.D.C. 1986).
284. Jones, Civ. A. No. 88-5723, 1989 WL 49517, at *7.
285. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 173
(M.D. Pa. 1989) ("[It is well established that damages are a legal remedy.").
286. Jons, Civ. A. No. 88-5723, 1989 WL 49517, at *5.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *8. See also, Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 944 F.2d 940, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
289. Joms, Civ. A. No. 88-5723, 1989 WL 49517, at *11.
290. 927 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1991).
be susceptible to other meanings and thus be considered ambiguous."
Instead, the court embarked on a decidedly narrow inquiry and fol-
lowed that Circuit's precedent set by NEPACCO.' The court con-
strued Arkansas law and concluded that because it was substantially
similar to Missouri insurance contract law 3 the only issue was
"whether the district court erred in its interpretation of state law."'
Finding no error, the court affirmed." .
Significantly, the court noted that the Arkansas District Court ex-
pressed its "reservation about the correctness" of the NEPACCO hold-
ing, but still acquiesced to precedent because it found Arkansas and
Missouri law similar.' Thus, even within the Eighth Circuit, the dis-
trict court was critical of the NEPACCO holding.
The Jones Truck decision displays a willingness to look beyond the
NEPACCO precedent and fully determine how the issue would be ana-
lyzed under existing Missouri law. However, the Grisham court's hold-
ing highlights NEPACCO's inherent danger because it permits states to
simply determine whether their state insurance law is identical to Mis-
souri and then merely follow NEPACCO without challenging the analy-
sis.
2. Interpretation and Application of Missouri Insurance Contract
Law
As noted above, the IPC court accurately described Missouri insur-
ance law, which defers to the intent and expectations of the insured. 7
As additional support for its decision, the court noted that the CGL
policies purchased by IPC did not contain any specific exclusionary lan-
guage.2" Similarly, the Second Circuit also found the lack of
exclusionary language important because it adds to the insured's expec-
tation of coverage.'
291. Id. at 104142.
292. 1d at 1042.
293. See Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W. 2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990)
(viewing the terms of the policy in the manner most likely to be understood by the
buyer of the policy).
294. Grisham, 927 F.2d at 1042.
295. Id
296. Id.
297. See Krombach, 785 S.W.2d at 731.
298. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940,
942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
299. See Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir.
1989) (stating that an ordinary businessman would believe he was covered for dam-
ages under a CGL policy "particularly absent any specific exclusionary language in
the policy").
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The application of Missouri law proved to be the major source of dis-
agreement between the Eighth Circuit and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. Throughout the opinion, the NEPACCO court defined the scope of
Missouri law without reference to any external sources.' However,
the Eighth Circuit faltered during the critical application phase."I In
contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit consistently applied Missouri
principles of law and viewed the Armco case as a product of a state
that adheres to a technical meaning of insurance terms,m rather than
as a universal interpretation as the NEPACCO court viewed the Armco
holding.'m
In addition, the IPC analysis was similar to other states whose insur-
ance contract law is consistent with Missouri law.' Therefore, the
District of Columbia Circuit was uniform in its characterization and ap-
plication of Missouri law.
3. The Statutory Language of CERCLA
The IPC court took a dim view of the insurer's argument that
CERCLA itself supports the notion that damages and cleanup costs are
not compatible.' The District of Columbia Circuit relied on a Su-
preme Court holding'm as well as several lower court decisions."
300. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842
F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (citing Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv. Inc.,
637 S.W. 2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (as to treatment of ambiguous language in
an insurance policy)).
301. Id. at 985 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 434
(D. Md. 1986)).
302. Indcendent Petrochemical Corp. 944 F.2d at 946 ("Decisions construing the
term differently were apparently governed by state rules of interpretation under which
the technical or legal meanings of language controlled.").
303. Continental, 842 F.2d at 985 ("Black letter insurance law holds that claims for
equitable relief are not claims for 'damages' under liability insurance contracts.").
304. See Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1203-05 (2d
Cir. 1989); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359,
1365-67 (D. Del. 1987); AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264-68 (Cal. 1990)
(en banc).
305. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 944 F.2d at 946-47. Accord AIU Ins. Co., 799
P.2d at 1270-71.
306. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1989) (adopting a broad
scope for damages in light of an absence of specific limiting statutory language). But
see Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 880 (1988) (defining "money damages" as
having an ordinary meaning which is "compensatory relief for an injury suffered").
Union Gas dealt with CERCLA related issues whereas Bowen was completely
Furthermore, since the CGL policies were purchased prior to CERCLA's
enactment it seems highly unlikely that at the time the policies were
signed, the parties intended to be bound by the provisions of
CERCLA.' m
CERCLA does not provide a definition of damages." This fact, cou-
pled with the observation that CERCLA was designed to be a broad-
based statute, serves to limit its importance in state insurance contract
law.
The Eighth Circuit's argument that the CERCLA provisions are fac-
tors favoring the insurer, fails to consider the basic Missouri rules of
insurance contract interpretation."' As previously noted, it is the in-
tent of the parties and their reasonable expectation that will govern
whether an ambiguous term is afforded a technical meaning."' To sim-
ply argue that the language in CERCLA indicates a distinction between
damages and cleanup costs is to ignore the basic inquiry mandated by
Missouri case law. Therefore, the IPC court found that the provisions of
CERCLA are not dispositive to the relevant issue of insurance policy
interpretation.3 1
2
VI. CONCLUSION
The IPC holding will not answer the question of who is liable for
CERCLA cleanup cost reimbursement under a CGL insurance policy.
There is no consensus as to whether damages are ambiguous or wheth-
er they are legal or equitable in nature. It is unlikely that these issues
will be resolved because they deal with an area that is reserved to the
states and their particular rules of insurance contract construction.
The IPC decision is valuable in that it may serve to re-establish the
distinction between states that adhere to a technical interpretation of
terms within insurance policies and those that do not. The NEPACCO
decision blurred that distinction which led to decisions such as
Grisham, where the district court, finding that Arkansas and Missouri
insurance law were similar, ended'its inquiry and deferred to the
NEPACCO precedent. This resulted despite the district court's uneasi-
outside of the CERCLA subject matter.
307. See Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.
1988); Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
308. See AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1271.
309. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 and Supp. H 1990).
310. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
311. See Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 785 S.W. 2d 728, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
312. Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940,
946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 20: 217, 1992] CERCLA and Hazardous Waste Cleanups
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ness with the NEPACCO holding. Hopefully, IPC will give states that
interpret insurance contracts with less emphasis on technical language
the impetus to utilize Abex, or similar precedents, to challenge the logic
of the NEPACCO decision.
Finally, the IPC holding may persuade the so-called technical mean-
ing states to re-evaluate that posture in light of the valid concerns for
the protection of the expectation and intent of the insured. The insured
is the weaker party in a relationship that is best characterized as being
one of adhesion. The insurer sets the premium, crafts the language and
has the expertise. Thus, it seems reasonable that the insurer should
carefully and clearly fashion the language to define the scope of the
covered risk and not depend on favorable judicial construction to do it
for him.
GARY M. MILLER

